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(1) The actuality of what potentially is, qua such (h( tou~ duna/ mei o1 ntov e0 ntele/ xeia, h[ \ | toiouton. Phys. 201a10-11) 2 (2) The actuality of the potential, qua potential (h9 tou~ dunatou, h[ | dunato/ n, e0 ntele/ xeia. Phys. 201b4-6).
This definition of change has been the focus of intense debate amongst modern scholars. 3 In an influential article, Robert Heinaman has advanced an interpretation of this definition, according to which the potentiality involved in the definition of change is a potentiality to change (to F) -as opposed to a potentiality for being the end-state of a change (i.e. F). Heinaman points to different versions of the definition in which the potentiality involved in change is explicitly specified as a potentiality to change (to F).
I will consider what Heinaman takes to be the unambiguous formulations: (1994) . The ones I quote, (2), (3) and (7) (corresponding to my (3), (4) and (5) nhtou), suggestion here that this must also be the case with the definition of change itself (i.e. (1) and (2) is omitted, rather than to be in conflict with them. This is particularly obvious in (5), for kinhtou~ and the qua clause here specified can easily be taken to complete (1). What I want to argue is that, even though Heinaman's interpretation of the definition of change and the evidence he points at in his article do show that there is an ambiguity in the definition of change as to which kind of potentiality Aristotle is referring to, they do not decisively establish that the potentiality involved in the definition of change is not a potentiality for being the end-state of a change.
First of all, there is no such definition as (5) in Aristotle's text. Heinaman argues that we can safely infer (5) from the following passage:
As we said, everything that produces change is also changed, if it is potentially changeable (to_ duna/ mei o1 n kinhto/ n) and its not being changed is rest (the not being changed of that which admits of change is rest). For to operate on this, qua such, is just what it is to produce change, and this it does by contact, so that it will at the same time also be acted upon (Phys. 202a3-7).
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The words to_ duna/ mei o1 n kinhto/ n are here being used to define rest (h0 remi/ a), which being the privation of change, can only be ascribed to what is duna/ mei kinhto/ n, that is, to what is potentially changeable. That is, being a privation, rest must presuppose the concept of change and must be defined in terms of it. But there is no respectively), are taken from this article. 5 Aristotle continues: "because of this, change is the actuality of the changeable (kinhto/ n) qua changeable ...." (202a7). This explicit passage would support Heinaman's view if it were not for the fact that kinhto/ n is not here completing to_ duna/ mei o1 n, but replacing it. Moreover, this passage occurs in a context in which Aristotle is working out his reformulation of the definition of change in terms of agency and patiency, and Heinaman has not shown that this reformulation is equivalent to the original definition. It is also worth pointing out that Edward Hussey excludes this passage (202a7-9) from his translation (See Hussey, E. (1983) . Physics: Books III and IV. Clarendon Aristotle Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press).
at about (3) and (4)? First, it is worth noting that (3) and (4) (3) and (4) show (jointly with the three remaining definitions of locomotion, increase and decrease, and coming to be and ceasing to be at Phys. 201a10ff) is, at most, a conflict with the general definitions of change, (1) and (2).
That this is the c -(1) -itself as the e0 ntele/ xeia of what potentially is (tou~ duna/ mei o1 ntov),
where, in the absence of independent evidence like (5), "what potentially is" is not to be taken as meaning "what potentially is changing". There is no suggestion in Aristotle's texts that the participle o1 n of the verb 'to be' in the expression to_ duna/ mei o1 n (to formulate (5) in the nominative) is to be taken exclusively as elliptical or as a copula;
i.e. to_ duna/ mei o1 n F, the substituend of F being kinhto/ n. Moreover, this latter is the only substituend which Heinaman can appeal to, and we have already noticed that it will not do the job Heinaman requires, for it means "changeable", thus rendering the meaning of the expression unintelligible (i.e. what is potentially changeable).
Secondly, the first definition of change - (1) In the first two lines, Aristotle is pointing out to his previous argument (Phys. and what is potentially (tou~ de_ duna/ mei) according to each category, is that change takes place between something X being potentially F at t (being actually non-F) and the same thing X being actually F at t', where F and non-F are opposite predicates within the same category. There is no suggestion in the line of argument developed in the whole preface to the definition of change for the claim that, as subscribed to the categories, to_ duna/ mei is to be understood as what is potentially changing to F, rather than what potentially is F.
And finally, the conflict is stressed by some evidence which Heinaman does not consider as telling against his own interpretation. I mean, for th e bronze is potentially a statue (o( xalko_ v duna/ mei a0 ndria/ v), but yet it is not the actuality of bronze qua bronze that is change" (Phys. 201a30), where it is natural to complete the sentence with "but the actuality of the bronze qua potentially a statue".
Heinaman thinks these lines do not constitute evidence against his interpretation because he reads the immediately following lines (201a31-32) as follows: "For the bronze and to be potentially changing (kinhtw| ) are not the same..." -following the insertion of kinhtw| in some MSS. The insertion of kinhtw| however, is extremely dubious: it is omitted in the parallel text of Metaphysica 1065b26, which is probably why David Ross omits it in his Oxford edition of the Physica.
I conclude, therefore, that Heinaman's interpretation of the definition of change and the evidence he points at in his article can only show that there is an am the definition of change as to which kind of potentiality Aristotle is referring to (an ambiguity that is, perhaps, deeply rooted in Aristotle's metaphysics, and that must be adequately explained). They do not decisively establish, however, that the potentiality 7 I use the word 'determination' instead of predicate, because substantial form is not a predicate.
